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ABSTRACT 
 
There is a line of thought, neglected in recent philosophy, according to which ​a                           
priori knowable truths such as those of logic and mathematics have their special                         
epistemic status in virtue of a certain tight connection between their meaning                       
and their truth. Historical associations notwithstanding, this view does not                   
mandate any kind of problematic deflationism about meaning, modality or                   
essence. On the contrary, we should be upfront about it being a highly                         
debatable metaphysical idea, while nonetheless insisting that it be given due                     
consideration. From this standpoint, I suggest that the Finean distinction                   
between essence and modality allows us to refine the view. While liberal about                         
meaning, modality and essence, the view is not without bite: it is reasonable to                           
suppose that it is able to ward off philosophical confusions stemming from the                         
undue assimilation of ​a priori​ to empirical knowledge. 
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What is it about truths, such as those of mathematics, which enable them to be known 
without recourse to empirical evidence? There is a line of thinking - curiously out of fashion 
in philosophy today, but still, I think, very much alive in the broader intellectual culture - 
according to which there is a close connection between the ​meaning​ of true ​a priori 
statements and their truth. 
 
There is an overlooked and defensible view along these lines which deserves to be 
considered. According to this view, what distinguishes ​a priori​ statements  from other true 1
statements is that it is ​essential​ to them - given what they mean - that they are true. This 
offers us a way of accounting for the special epistemic status of ​a priori​ truths in semantic 
and essentialist terms. Furthermore, it offers us a way of understanding what is special and 
distinctive about such truths beyond just their special epistemic status; not only do 
mathematical and other ​a priori​ statements seem to be special in regards to how they can be 
known - they also seem to be special in and of themselves, different from empirical 
statements. Or so many have felt. 
 
It may seem that this whole line of thought has been discredited, along with 
conventionalism about logic and mathematics, conventionalism about modality, failed 
1 I will write of ‘​a priori​’ statements, meaning statements which can be known ​a priori​ to be true. 
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projects in the foundations of mathematics, and the positivist idea that a meaningful 
statement is either empirically verifiable or at bottom a matter of convention.  In this paper 2
I hope to make a good case that this is not so; whether or not one ultimately agrees with it, 
this line of thought deserves to be freed from such discredited ideas. Indeed, a great logician 
saw this already by 1951. In his Gibbs lecture, after criticizing the conventionalism of the 
logical positivists, Gödel makes the following important concession: 
 
However, it seems to me that nevertheless one ingredient of this wrong theory of 
mathematical truth [i.e. conventionalism] is perfectly correct and really discloses the 
true nature of mathematics. Namely, it is correct that a mathematical proposition 
says nothing about the physical or psychical reality existing in space and time, 
because it is true already owing to the meaning of the terms occurring in it, 
irrespectively of the world of real things. What is wrong, however, is that the 
meaning of the terms (that is, the concepts they denote) is asserted to be something 
man-made and consisting merely in semantical conventions. (Gödel (1951/1995), p. 
320.) 
 
As is well known, Gödel was critical of positivism, and had Platonistic, metaphysical 
tendencies of thought. But he nevertheless held the view that the ​a priori​ truths of 
mathematics are ‘true already owing to the meaning of the terms occurring’ in them, and 
that this ‘discloses the true nature of mathematics’. Perhaps the diverse philosophers who 
thought things like this, which are currently so unfashionable, were on to something. Or 
perhaps they were not. Either way, we should not simply throw out the thought along with 
the problematic deflationary attitudes to meaning, essence and modality taken by many 
Twentieth Century proponents of the thought. If we do that, we are either throwing out an 
important insight, or throwing out something which is importantly wrong or confused 
without understanding ​why​ it is wrong or confused. It is the object of this paper to prevent 
such an indiscriminate throwing out by putting on the table a version of the thought which 
patently does not presuppose deflationary views on meaning, essence and modality, and 
which arguably has a lot to recommend it. 
 
In the remainder of this introduction I specify a little more carefully the topic and the job 
which is supposed to be done by the view I am making a plea for. In Section 2 I underline the 
basic intuitive appeal of this kind of view. In Section 3 I argue that Fine’s (1994) distinction 
between essential properties and merely necessarily-possessed ones allows us to refine and 
isolate a formidable version of this sort of view: ​a priori​ statements are essentially true. In 
Section 4 I reply to some objections. 
 
2 The ​locus classicus​ of this sort of view, in the English-speaking world at least, is Ayer (1936). See 
Creath (2017) for an overview of logical positivism (also known as ‘logical empiricism’). 
Pre-print - November 2019 - Forthcoming in ​Metaphysica 
Our topic is apriority construed as a property of statements. For a statement to be ​a priori​ is 
for it to be knowable ​a priori​. And to be knowable ​a priori​ is to be knowable in a certain way - 
knowable independently of experience in a certain sense. (You might like to think of the 
apriority of statements as derivative of the apriority of the way they can be known.) Exactly 
what it is to be ​independent​ of experience, and exactly what counts as ​experience​, are difficult 
issues which I will not pursue here. (For further background on the ​a priori​, see Jenkins 
(2008) and Restall (2009).) Here I will just assume that the notion of apriority makes sense 
and that we have a reasonable working grasp of it. One basic, familiar point worth 
rehearsing here is that the idea is not that a subject doesn’t need any experience of the world 
at all to come to know an ​a priori​ truth. For they may have no hope of understanding such a 
truth without experiences which furnish them with the necessary concepts. Rather, the idea 
is ​that ​a priori​ truths can be known ‘independent of experience ​beyond that which is needed to 
acquire the relevant concepts needed to understand those propositions​’​ (Russell (2017), §4, emphasis 
in original). 
 
The version of the line of thought we began with which will be proposed here - as worthy of 
serious consideration, if not as the ultimate truth - is going to be that ​a priori​ statements are 
knowable in their peculiar way because they have the special feature that their truth is 
essential to them. Note that the task is ​not​ to define ‘​a priori​’, nor to analyse the concept of 
apriority, nor to identify the property of apriority with something. Rather, the intended 
starting point is that we have a reasonable working idea of what apriority is, and we would 
like to know what it is about ​a priori​ statements which makes them ​a priori​. 
 
I will not try to fill in the view with any particular view about statements and meaning, nor 
any particular view about how or whether to analyze essence. The view I want to suggest is 
supposed to be attractive independent of any particular set of theoretical preferences with 
respect to those topics, and the purpose of this paper is just to get it on the table. 
 
2. The basic idea 
 
Underlying the line of thought I want to develop is the following basic idea: ​a priori 
statements like those of mathematics do not ​impose conditions​ on the world, which the world 
may meet or fail to meet. They do not ​reach out ​into the world to get their truth values. They 
have their truth values off their own bat. 
 
A striking allegorical expression of this idea can be found in Wittgenstein (1974, p. 455): 
 
We may imagine a mathematical proposition as a creature which itself knows 
whether it is true or false (in contrast with propositions of experience). 
 
Since statements (in the relevant sense) are either statement-making sentences together 
with their meanings, or the meanings themselves, this basic idea leads directly to the idea of 
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a tight connection between meaning and truth on the part of ​a priori​ statements. In the next 
section I will argue that the notion of essence is a good candidate for specifying the 
connection; ​a priori​ statements are essentially true. 
 
I am not trying to downplay how contentious and difficult to assess the basic idea is. Rather, 
I am taking it as a starting point that is compelling to many, and proposing a way of 
capturing it as a formidable philosophical thesis. The resulting view, that ​a priori​ statements 
are essentially true, is going to be highly debatable. One of the troubling things about 
prominent Twentieth Century developments of the basic idea is that they can seem 
dogmatic, and when espoused by anti-metaphysical philosophers - Ayer (1936) is a 
paradigmatic example - open to the charge of hypocrisy about metaphysics. Many who held 
versions of this idea, it would seem, failed to perceive the extent to which it is a 
metaphysical one. As with many if not all metaphysical ideas, other people may be drawn to 
an opposite view, and this difference may be very hard to navigate and resolve. I would 
suggest that failure to be upfront about its debatable, metaphysical status has besmirched 
the idea, resulting in a lack of attention to it and complacency about the opposite view. 
Re-presenting it as an unabashedly metaphysical idea may lead to a better assessment of it, 
and perhaps even a better philosophical understanding of the ​a priori​. 
 
3. Why essence? 
 
To see what is attractive about an essence-based version of our line of thought, let us first 
consider the idea that the close connection between ​a priori​ statements’ meaning and truth is 
modal: that is what special about ​a priori​ statements is that their meanings necessitate their 
truth. How might we spell this idea out? 
 
It might seem natural to say that an ​a priori​ statement has its truth necessarily, except that 
this runs straight into the existence of the necessary ​a posteriori​ (widely accepted in light of 
Kripke (1980)). Some ​a posteriori​ statements are necessary, so it can’t be that what is special 
about ​a priori​ statements is simply that they are necessary. 
 
How could we avoid this problem while retaining a modal approach to our line of thought? 
One way might be to focus on an ‘internal’ aspect of meaning,  and maintain that ​a priori 3
statements are such that this aspect of their meaning necessitates their truth, i.e. that with 
an ​a priori ​statement S, it is necessary that any statement whose internal meaning is the 
same as S’s is true. This may then be argued to rule out cases of the necessary ​a posteriori​: 
‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is true, but in another possible world language users could have a 
3 E.g. Fregean sense (see Frege (1892)) (or something which is like a Fregean sense, but does not 
determine reference all by itself), a primary intension (see Chalmers (2006)), role in a system (see 
Wittgenstein (1974, Part I), Haze (2018)), conceptual role (see Båve (2015)), or a cognitive event type 
(see Soames (2010)) (or something which is like a Soamesean cognitive event type, but does not 
determine reference all by itself). 
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sentence with the same internal meaning - playing the same sort of role in their linguistic 
and cognitive lives - but which is false. Another approach to avoiding the problem of the 
necessary ​a posteriori​, not requiring the isolation of an internal aspect of meaning, might be 
to appeal to a modal notion distinct from the notion of necessity in Kripke (1980). ​That 
notion is subjunctive, or counterfactual - about what could have been the case had things 
gone differently. But if we use an indicative, actuality-based notion of necessity - about how 
things actually must be - we may be able to avoid this.  (The availability of such a notion, 4
especially one which is conceptually distinct from apriority, may however be controversial.) 
 
These two approaches - staying subjunctive and picking out an internal aspect of meaning, 
or going indicative - face a common problem: they will count as ​a priori​ statements which we 
might hesitate to count as ​a priori​. I have in mind statements which will, on these 
approaches, count as ​a priori​ for what may be called transcendental reasons. That is, 
statements whose very instantiation guarantees their truth, such as ‘Language exists’ (where 
language is regarded as a spatiotemporal phenomenon) and ‘I exist’.  Call these 5
‘transcendental statements’. Depending on the details of how you understand apriority - the 
details, for instance, of how you think about experience and the dependence of knowledge 
or justification thereon - you may think that these transcendental statements aren’t ​a priori​. 
Or you might think that they are - but in that case, I submit, you should be prepared to 
recognise that they are ​a priori​ in a different way which should not just be lumped together 
with the way in which more paradigmatically ​a priori​ statements are ​a priori​. And thus a 
merely modal approach to characterising the tight connection between paradigmatically ​a 
priori​ statements’ meaning and their truth leaves something to be desired. It either 
overgenerates (if the transcendental statements aren’t ​a priori​) or fails to get at the heart of 
what is special about paradigmatically ​a priori​ statements, instead only getting at a feature 
they share with statements like ‘Language exists’ and ‘I exist’ which, if they are ​a priori​, are so 
in a peculiar and fairly peripheral way. 
 
This situation, I suggest, should remind us of the problem raised by Fine (1994) for the view 
that the essential properties of an object are its necessarily-possessed ones. Socrates 
necessarily belongs to his singleton set {Socrates}, and is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel 
Tower. But it seems wrong to say that it is part of Socrates’s essence - that it is an essential 
property of Socrates - that he belongs to his singleton, or that he is distinct from the Eiffel 
Tower. Intuitively, these properties don’t have enough to do with Socrates himself to count 
as essential to him.  6
4 In this connection, see Chalmers (1998). 
5 These are discussed in Chalmers (2006, §2.4). 
6 In addition to arguing forcefully that not all cases of necessarily possessing a property are cases of 
essentially possessing that property, Fine argued that we should not attempt to explain essence in 
terms of necessity, and instead go the other way around. The explanation of apriority suggested in 
the present paper does not depend on this Finean position about proper explanatory order; you could 
agree that essential property possession isn’t merely necessary property possession, while opting, 
say, for an explanation of essence in terms of necessity plus something else. (Examples of the latter 
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The same kind of thing is going on, I suggest, with the difference between (core) ​a priori 
statements and transcendental statements. The notion of essence gives us what we need to 
pick out the (core) ​a priori​ statements and rule out the transcendental ones. What is special 
about (core) ​a priori​ statements, and which explains their peculiar epistemic status, is that 
they are essentially true. That is, the property of truth is essential to them; they are by their 
very nature true. That, I suggest, is how we should capture in a proper philosophical thesis 
the feeling that they are “true off their own bat”, “carry their truth within them”, “do not 
reach out into the world for their truth”, “are creatures which know that they are true”, etc. 
This thesis may of course be incorrect or otherwise in need of critique. But it merits serious 
consideration. 
 
4. Objections and replies 
 
Objection: Does this idea have teeth? In smoothing the rough edges of the line of thought 
you began with, haven’t you perhaps ended up with something which may sound insightful 
but is actually trivial?  
 
Reply: To have this worry is to lose sight of the fact that an opposite viewpoint is possible. 
One may think that, just like empirical statements, true mathematical statements do not, or 
at least do not in general, have their truth-values essentially - that they in some way must 
“reach out into the world for their truth”. Insofar as it is reasonable to think that much 
philosophical confusion about mathematical statements and our knowledge of them stems 
from undue assimilation of them to empirical statements, it is reasonable to think that the 
view being put forward here has real power to ward off such confusion. 
 
Objection: This talk of essential truth sounds a bit like ‘truth in virtue of meaning’, i.e. 
analyticity. Does the view you propose come with a commitment to the controversial - many 
would say discredited - idea that mathematical truths are analytic? 
 
Reply: The idea that ​a priori​ statements are essentially true does indeed furnish us with a 
weak, charitable reading of the claim that mathematical truths are analytic. But concepts of 
analyticity are available which are narrower in extent, and the view put forward here is 
compatible with mathematical truths not being analytic in those senses.  7
 
include Cowling (2013), Wildman (2013), and Denby (2014). For an argument against such 
approaches, see Zylstra (2019).) 
7 Types of narrower concepts of analyticity include: competence-based (roughly, a truth is analytic in 
this sense if anyone who understands it knows it to be true), Fregean (a truth is analytic in this sense 
if it is a logical truth or if it can be obtained from a logical truth by substitution of synonyms), and the 
traditional Kantian conception (a truth is analytic if its predicate is contained in its subject). 
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Objection: This view fails to explain ​how​ we have knowledge of mathematics and logic, and is 
therefore not a satisfactory account of apriority. 
 
Reply: It all depends on what is behind the question ‘How do we have knowledge of 
mathematics and logic?’. If this is asked from a point of view which, by implicitly treating ​a 
priori​ statements as being like empirical statements in reaching out into the world for their 
truth-values, makes the existence of ​a priori​ knowledge seem puzzling, then the view that ​a 
priori​ statements are essentially true can neutralise this puzzlement. However, if what you 
want is an informative positive explanation of how we get ​a priori​ knowledge, then I agree 
that this view will not by itself satisfy you. If such an explanation must be part of what you 
call ‘an account of apriority’, then indeed you should not call this view ‘an account of 
apriority’. I suggest that you should nevertheless take the view seriously as a non-trivial 
answer to the question of what it is about ​a priori ​statements that makes them knowable 
without recourse to experience. 
 
References 
 
Ayer, A. J. (1936). ​Language, Truth and Logic​. London: V. Gollancz. 
 
Båve, Arvid (2015). Conceptual Role Semantics. ​Oxford Bibliographies Online​. 
  
Chalmers, David (1998). The tyranny of the subjunctive. (Unpublished talk handout.) 
<​http://consc.net/papers/tyranny.html​> 
 
Chalmers, David J. (2006). The foundations of two-dimensional semantics. In Manuel 
Garcia-Carpintero & Josep Macia (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics: Foundations and 
Applications. Oxford University Press 55-140.  
 
Cowling, S. (2013). The modal view of essence. ​Canadian Journal of Philosophy​, ​43​(2), 248–266. 
 
Creath, Richard. (2017). Logical Empiricism. ​Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
<​http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-empiricism/> 
 
Denby, D. (2014). Essence and intrinsicality. In R. Francescotti (Ed.), ​Companion to intrinsic 
properties​ (pp. 87–109). Berlin: De Gruyter. 
 
Fine, Kit (1994). Essence and modality. ​Philosophical Perspectives​ 8:1-16. 
 
Frege, Gottlob (1892). Über Sinn und Bedeutung. ​Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische 
Kritik​ 100: 25–50. Translated as “On Sense and Reference” by M. Black in ​Translations 
from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege​, P. Geach and M. Black (eds. and trans.), 
Oxford: Blackwell, third edition, 1980. 
Pre-print - November 2019 - Forthcoming in ​Metaphysica 
 
Godel, Kurt (1951/1995). Some basic theorems on the foundations of mathematics and their 
implications. In Solomon Feferman (ed.), ​Kurt Gödel, Collected Works​. Oxford University 
Press 290-304. (Originally delivered on 26 December 1951 as the 25th annual Josiah Willard 
Gibbs Lecture at Brown University.) 
 
Haze, Tristan Grøtvedt (2018). Propositions, Meaning, and Names. ​Philosophical Forum​ 49 
(3):335-362. 
 
Jenkins, C. S. (2008). A priori knowledge: Debates and developments. ​Philosophy Compass​ 3 
(3):436–450. 
 
Kripke, Saul A. (1980).​ Naming and Necessity​. Harvard University Press. 
 
Restall, Greg (2009). A priori truths. In John Shand (ed.), ​Central Issues of Philosophy​. 
Wiley-Blackwell. 
 
Russell, Bruce (2014). ​A Priori​ Justification and Knowledge. ​Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
<​http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/apriori/​> 
 
Soames, Scott (2010). ​What is Meaning?​. Princeton University Press. 
 
Wildman, Nathan (2013). Modality, Sparsity, and Essence. ​Philosophical Quarterly​ 63 
(253):760-782. 
 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1974). ​Philosophical Grammar​. University of California Press. 
 
Zylstra, Justin (2019). Essence, necessity, and definition. ​Philosophical Studies​ 176 (2):339-350. 
